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Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick, District Juuge presiding. 
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I. 
THE DEFENSES ASSERTED WERE NOT FRIVOLOUS 
A. Plaintiff's entire argument rests on a misinterpretation of Idaho law 
The thrust of this appeal is best exemplified by the differing interpretations on the legal 
requirements necessary for a proper finding that a claim or defense was pursued frivolously. As 
noted in the Appellants' Brief, in order to be awarded attorney's fees the district court must find 
that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation.! When deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into 
account? Pursuant to Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., if there is a 
legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-121.3 
Specifically, the Court in that case stated: 
When deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be 
taken into account. Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney 
fees may not be awarded under I.C. 12-121 even though the losing party has 
asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation.4 
Defendants contend that a plain reading of this language leads to the obvious and 
inescapable conclusion that the phrase "may not" is mandatory, rather than permissive. In other 
I Needs v. Idaho State Dep't a/Cor., 115 Idaho 399, 766 P.2d 1280 (Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added), 
2135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001) (citation omitted). 
3 !d. (emphasis added). 
4Id. (emphasis added). 
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words, if there is a single, legitimate triable issue of fact (even in the presence of facts or claims 
that are indeed frivolous) an award of attorney's fees is simply not proper. 
Plaintiff argues the opposite. Plaintiff's entire argument that it is entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees is premised on its interpretation that "may not," as used in this context, is 
permissive rather than mandatory. Plaintiff argues that Defendants misinterpret this language in 
that "Mr. Maslen has interposed the mandatory 'cannot' for the permissive 'may not' used by 
this COurt.,,5 Pursuant to Plaintiff's interpretation of this language, a court 'may' or 'may not' 
award attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact. Plaintiff's 
interpretation is inherently flawed both grammatically and substantively. 
Indeed, Plaintiff cites to no case where a court has interpreted the phrase 'may not' as 
permissive. That is likely because in In re Brandt, it was recognized "[ c ]ourts that have 
construed 'may not' have consistently held that the phrase is mandatory and not permissive or 
discretionary.,,6 In that case, the bankruptcy court for the district of Tennessee considered 
whether the term "may not" as used in the Service Members' Civil Relief Act of 2003 mandated 
the tolling of the statute of limitations in an adversary proceeding.7 The language at issue in In re 
Brandt states: 
5 Respondent's Brief, p. 16. 
6 In re Brandt, 437 B.R. 294 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Tenn. 2010) (citing Stringer v. Realty Unlimited, Inc., 97 S.W. 3d 446, 
448 (Ky. 2002); Clark v. Reihl, 313 Ky. 142,230 S.W.2d 626,627 (1950); In re Denial of Application for Issuance 
of One Original (New) On-Premises Consumption Beer/Wine License, 267 Mont. 298, 883 P.2d 833 (1994); 
Washington v. Gettman, 56 Wash.App. 51, 782 P.2d 216, 218 (1989); In re Meekins, 554 P.2d 872, 875 
(Okla.Ct.App. 1976); Ryan v. Montgomery, 396 Mich. 213, 240 N.W.2d 236 (1976); De Haviland v. Warner Bros. 
Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal.App.2d 225, 13 P.2d 983 (1944». 
7 In re Brandt, 437 at 296. 
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The period of a service member's military service may not be included in 
computing any period limited by law, regulation, or order for the bringing of any 
action or proceeding in a court, or in any board, bureau, commission, department, 
or other agency of a State (or political subdivision of a State) or the United States 
by or against the service member's heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns.8 
The dispute centered around whether 'may not' was a permissive or mandatory term.9 
The court recognized that the United States Supreme Court has said "[t]he word 'may,' when 
used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion. The common-sense principle of 
statutory construction is by no means invariable, however, ... , and can be defeated by indications 
of legislative intent to the contrary or by obvious inference form the structure and purpose of the 
statute." I 0 
The court in In re Brandt, however, went on to state that when used in conjunction with 
'not,' 'may' is not deemed to connote discretion, "rather 'may not' most often is construed as if 
it were 'shall not. ",11 Further, it was recognized "there is no grammatical ambiguity created 
when the legislature provides that something 'may not' be done. In a statute, the phrase, 'may 
not' has exactly the same meaning as 'shall not.",12 Based on the review of cases analyzing the 
term 'may not' in a similar fashion, the court found that the 'period of military service shall not 
be included in computing any period ... ,,13 
8 !d., p. 297 (quoting 50 U.S. C. app. § 526(a» (emphasis in original). 
9 Id. 
10 !d., p. 298 (citing United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706103 S.Ct. 2132 (1983». 
II Id. 
12 !d. (emphasis added). 
13 Id., p. 299 (emphasis in original). 
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With the conclusion that "may not" is the equivalent to "shall not," it is useful to 
reexamine the language used in Nampa Irrigation. It then becomes irrefutable that "[i]f there is 
a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees" shall not "be awarded under I.e. 12-121 even 
though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation." This is the only proper interpretation of Nampa Irrigation and Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 thereby making Plaintiffs entire legal argument on the issue of frivolousness unsound. 
Not only is Plaintiffs interpretation of "may not" as used in Nampa Irrigation 
grammatically fallacious, it is not consistent with the remainder of the sentence in which the term 
is used. If a court "may" award attorney's fees when a legitimate triable issue is presented, the 
statement: "even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation" loses any meaning whatsoever. 
Finally, Plaintiffs position that "may not" is permissive rather than mandatory conflicts 
with the plain language of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) which states: "attorney fees 
under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the 
facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, 
or without foundation ... ,,14 Again, under Plaintiffs view, a court could properly award attorney 
fees pursuant to this rule even if the case was not pursued or defended frivolously. Such an 
interpretation conflicts directly with the plain language of this rule. 
Plaintiffs entire argument that it was properly awarded attorney's fees rests on the 
argument that 'may not' as used by this Court in Nampa Irrigation is permissive, rather than 
14I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) (emphasis added). 
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mandatory. If Plaintiffs position is rejected by the Court, no basis exists for an award of 
attorney's fees against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the district court's award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff. 
B. Defendants presented a meritorious defense 
Although Plaintiff attempts to downplay their importance, it cannot be seriously disputed 
that Defendants prevailed on multiple claims and issues. First and foremost, Plaintiff asserted a 
claim of general damages totaling between $100,000 and $602,449. 15 Plaintiff asserted a claim 
for attorney's fees in the amount of $133,769.27 as damage in the action. 16 Finally, Plaintiff 
sought $60,000 in damage representing the value of the aircraft. 17 It is undisputed that Plaintiff 
received $0 in damage at trial. This fact alone is sufficient to establish that the defense presented 
cannot be deemed frivolous. 18 
Rather than dispute its failure to prove any of the damages it sought, Plaintiff downplays 
the issue by arguing that they were merely "post trial back of the envelope damage calculations" 
thereby implying that Plaintiff did not actually seek such damage. 19 One would be hard pressed 
to believe that had Plaintiff been awarded some or all of the damages that it claimed that Plaintiff 
would give up its claim or right to such damages. 
Moreover, these claimed damages were much more than an "afterthought" as Plaintiff 
suggests. The $133,769.27 in claimed attorney's fees as damage for example was heavily 
15 Supp. R., p. 31. 
16 R. Vol. II, p. 159. 
17 Court Trial Day 1, pp. 65-66. 
18 See Turner v. Willis, 119 Idaho lO23, 812 P.2d 737 (1991). 
19 Respondent's Brief, p. 13. 
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litigated and disputed throughout the case and Defendants clearly and wholly prevailed on this 
issue. On November 25, 2011, Plaintiff filed an expert disclosure identifying John Runft, J. 
Kahle Becker, and Jon Steele as expert witnesses for Plaintiffs $133,769.27 in alleged attorney's 
fees. 2o Defendants filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude evidence of such damages.21 
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition which takes a much different position than the one 
they are taking now.z2 In that response, Plaintiff states: "From the outset of this litigation, 
Plaintiff has claimed its attorney fees and costs as an item of damages.,,23 Plaintiff stated that it 
had provided "regular updates as to the amount of attorney's fees throughout this litigation.,,24 
Plaintiff stated that it "will present evidence that its attorney's fees and costs throughout trial and 
a possible appeal total $133,769.27 and that 'Plaintiff and its attorneys have no objection to and 
stand ready to be deposed regarding these fees. ",25 Plaintiff submitted affidavits in support of its 
claim for attorney's fees. 26 Even after the trial court disallowed evidence of such damage, 27 
Plaintiff called its attorney Mr. Becker as a witness in an attempt to introduce such evidence.28 
Plaintiff reiterated its claim to such damage in its post-trial brief.29 
Clearly, Plaintiff sought these damages before trial, during trial, and after trial. Despite 
these consistent efforts to recover hundreds of thousands of dollars, the district court awarded 
20 R. Vol. II, p. 212. 
21 Id., pp. 168-220. 
22 !d., pp. 222-36. 
23 !d., p. 223. 
24 Id., p. 224. 
25 d t ., p. 225. 
26 Id., p. 140-167; 227-236. 
27 !d. 
28 Court Trial, Day 3, pp. 626-645. 
29 Supp. R., pp. 15-37. 
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Plaintiff none of the damages it claimed. Plaintiff s present argument that such evidence was 
merely 'post trial back of the envelope' calculations is disingenuous and ignores the undisputed 
facts and procedural history of the case. Hundreds of thousands of dollars may appear trivial to 
Plaintiff and its counsel, but such an award would have been financially devastating to 
Defendants. Again, the fact that Defendants prevailed on the issue of damages, precludes a 
finding that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Defendants not only presented non-frivolous defenses to Plaintiffs claims and damages, 
but Defendants also prevailed on a majority of the causes of actions asserted. Moreover, 
Defendants avoided hundreds of thousands of dollars in alleged liability. The district court, 
therefore, abused its discretion in determining that Defendants were liable for attorney's fees and 
costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
C. AOl's Counterclaim was not pursued frivolously 
AOI asserted a counterclaim against Plaintiff consisting of two counts: foreclosure oflien 
and unjust enrichment.3o AOI was the only counterclaimant as Mr. Maslen did not assert any 
counterclaims.31 It must also be reiterated that the lien was filed solely by AOl,32 It was signed 
by Charles Vollman.33 Holbrook Maslen did not sign or file the lien.34 
30 R. Vol. I, pp. 106-11. 
31 !d. 
32 Court Trial Day 3, pp. 754-55. 
33 Id.; R. Vol. III, p. 363. 
34 R. Vol. III, p. 363. 
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Despite the undisputed factual record on this point, Plaintiff continues to allege the 
"charges underlying Defendants' liens were false.,,35 Only one defendant - namely AOI - filed a 
lien. As stated in the Appellants' Brief, the district court found that "Defendants' entire defense 
(and AOI's counterclaim) was based on the assertion that Plaintiff did not have an immediate 
right to possession of the aircraft (and that Defendants had such a right) because one or both of 
the Defendants had a valid possessory lien on the aircraft.,,36 
First, it cannot be said that the counterclaim regarding the lien was frivolous. While not 
successful, AOI had a good faith basis for asserting the lien based upon the relationship IAHOF, 
the work and money expended maintaining the aircraft, as well as the fact that there was no basis 
to conclude that AOI was bound to provide free storage to IMHS after it acquired the aircraft.3? 
Second, these facts give rise to an equitable claim for unjust enrichment. As noted in the 
Appellants' brief, AOI presented competent evidence on every element of its unjust enrichment 
claim. First, it was undisputed at trial that the PT-23 Fairchild (and thus Plaintiffs) benefited 
from the required indoor storage.38 Second, AOI presented evidence that IMHS appreciated the 
benefit of the storage and maintenance. It was undisputed that neither AOI nor Defendant 
Maslen had any agreement with IMHS to store the PT-23 - gratuitously or otherwise.39 IMHS 
was aware that AOI was storing the aircraft when it was transferred.4o Finally, AOI presented 
competent evidence that it would be inequitable to allow IMHS to retain the benefit of the 
35 Respondent's Brief, p. 14. 
36 R. Vol. III, p. 608. 
37 R. Vol. I, p. 7l. 
38 Court Trial Day 3, p. 552. 
39 Id., p. 749. 
40 Id., pp. 530-32. 
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storage and maintenance without paying for it. It was undisputed that AOI never had an 
agreement to store the aircraft, gratuitously or otherwise, for IMHS. Clearly IMHS knowingly 
benefited from the storage and maintenance provided by AOI. Under these circumstances, AOI 
properly argued that it would be inequitable for IMHS to knowingly benefit from AOI's efforts. 
Further, it cannot be found that both Mr. Maslen and AOI are jointly and severally liable 
for the claimed attorney's fees. There was never any finding that AOI was a 'sham entity,' 
despite the numerous references to such in the Respondent's Brief. Plaintiff did not bring a 
claim to pierce the corporate veil of AOI. The district court did not conclude that AOI was a 
sham entity. Absent such a finding, there is no basis for the district court to conclude that both 
Mr. Maslen and AOI are liable for Plaintiffs attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-12l. 
Based on the foregoing, the district court erred in concluding that AOI's counterclaim 
was frivolous and abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to IMHS under Idaho Code § 
12-121 jointly and severally against AOI and Mr. Maslen. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Finally, Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to its attorney's fees for defending against this 
appeal. Plaintiff cites only to Idaho Code § 12-121 as a basis for an award of attorney's fees. 
"This Court only awards attorney fees under this statute when 'an appeal was brought, pursued, 
or defended in a manner that was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. ,,,41 
41 Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, _, 281 P.3d 115, 128 (2012). 
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First and foremost, in the event that Defendants' appeal is successful in whole or in part, 
an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 would not be proper because it 
could not be said that the appeal was frivolous. 
Even if unsuccessful, however, Defendants have not pursued this appeal frivolously or 
unreasonably. In awarding Plaintiff attorney's fees, the district court found that the defense 
presented was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. However, Defendants have 
presented unrefuted facts that they avoided hundreds of thousands of dollars in liability and 
prevailed on a majority of the claims before the District Court. Moreover, Defendants have 
shown that Plaintiffs interpretation (and the district court's implicit adoption of Plaintiffs 
interpretation) regarding the interpretation of the term "may not" is simply incorrect. For these 
reasons, it cannot be said that this appeal has been pursued frivolously. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the district court abused its discretion in 
finding that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. As such, the 
determination that Plaintiff is entitled to such fees should be reversed. 
DATED this 22nd day of April, 2013. 
DINIUS LAW 
By:_-h,L.......lL.>l!::...._-b-""""==----___ ----"""""-_ 
Kevin . Dinius 
Mich el J. Hanby II 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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